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Abstract 
We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with "lumpy" 
effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on 
the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be 
consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms 
control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a 
constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.     
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1. Introduction  
The standard assumption in contest theory that players have a convex choice set 
may be a reasonable assumption when units of effort are sufficiently small, but there 
are many important contexts in which this assumption does not hold. For instance, it 
may be possible for a country to contain an overseas crisis using a small number of 
aircraft, but getting them there and maintaining them may require the use of an 
aircraft carrier. Thus, the actual choice is between a large operation and no operation 
at all. Likewise, there may be a large fixed cost in supplementing air power with 
"boots on the ground". More generally, the choice set may be further constrained by 
rules, laws and regulations, technological constraints, political constraints and the 
like. Our main result suggests that under reasonable conditions such strategic 
constraints heighten competition.   
We use a stylized model that may need significant modification to completely 
describe any given situation. Nevertheless, numerous real-world examples in 
various contexts can be explained by the model. Moreover, the model improves on 
those in the existent literature, which usually assume away problems of 
“granularity” of effort in contests. This is further discussed in the review of the 
literature.  
In particular, we consider two types of simultaneous two-player contests with 
non-increasing return on effort and a prize with a common value (or similar values). 
The first is a symmetric strategy contest in which both players have the same non-
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convex choice set of efforts (as perhaps in the case of the Cold War). The structure of 
the choice set that we consider is quite general. For instance, it can contain two 
separate convex subsets or it may be entirely discrete. The second type is an 
asymmetric strategy contest in which one player has a convex choice set of efforts 
while the other player's is non-convex, such as the case of the Taliban forces that 
have more flexible options than the Western coalition it faces. We present a complete 
characterization of the Nash equilibria of these contests.  
Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions deleting 
strategies from the players' strategy space heightens competition. In general, this 
result offers insight into the effect of strategic constraints on various situations that 
can be viewed as contests. One example is the offside rule in soccer that limits the set 
of possible positions for scoring a goal, but is considered to improve the 
competitiveness of the game. There are similar rules in other (team and individual) 
sports such as swimming, basketball, etc. An additional example in a different 
context is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Cold War 
superpowers that accelerated development of new nuclear delivery technologies. 
Other attempts at arms control apparently had a similar outcome.1   
Furthermore, in the asymmetric strategy contest, the strategic constraints 
allow the constrained player to make some sort of commitment. However, given that 
commitment usually has no value in the symmetric convex contest, she does not 
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 Such as the Washington Naval Treaty discussed in detail later in the text.  
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benefit from such constraints. Nevertheless, we show that under some circumstances 
it is preferable to be the constrained player.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the remainder of this section, we 
present a survey of the literature. In section 2, we describe the general model. Section 
3 characterizes equilibria in the symmetric strategy contest and derives conditions 
under which constraints on available strategies heighten competition. Section 4 
analyzes the asymmetric strategy contest and section 5 further generalizes our 
results. Section 6 concludes.  
Review of the literature 
Our model is related to the extensive and still growing literature on contests, 
which has been surveyed by Konrad (2009) and more recently by Corchón and 
Serena (2018). The assumptions commonly made in the literature are that players 
have a convex strategy space and that effort exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. 
These assumptions are usually made for the sake of tractability and analytic 
convenience. 
In settings where effort exhibits increasing returns, standard solution methods 
fail. In this case, researchers approximate the strategy space by considering the limit 
of a sequence of discretized versions of the game.2 Baye et al. (1994) were the first to 
apply this method to characterizing the mixed strategy equilibria in the Tullock 
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 Technically, the equilibrium characterization offered in these works represents the limit of a discrete 
strategy space rather than a convex one. It is an open question as to whether the limit equilibrium 
coincides with a real equilibrium. See Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) for a careful analysis of the issue.  
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contest (Tullock, 1980), in which return on effort is greater than two.3 Later studies 
that applied the same method include Amaldoss and Jain (2002), Rapoport and 
Amaldoss (2004) and Dechenaux et al. (2006). In their models, the non-convexity of 
strategies is merely a tool used to examine the equilibrium rather than a feature of 
interest on its own. In contrast, non-convex strategy spaces are the present model’s 
main focus, rather than a convenience. To be precise, we focus on contests with non-
increasing return on effort and a linear cost function for effort, which implies that the 
effective cost of effort is increasing and convex,4 as in the canonical models 
presented by Dixit (1987), Tullock (1980) and Skaperdas (1996). To the best of our 
knowledge, the convexity assumption regarding the strategy space has not been 
relaxed previously. 
A closely related model is Dubey (2013). He analyzed an all-pay auction with 
asymmetric players and incomplete information, in which players have a binary 
choice set. The restriction on the strategy space is intended mainly to permit 
equilibrium characterization with asymmetries and private information rather than 
being of interest in itself.  
We examine more general types of non-convexities and contest success functions. 
The tradeoff for adopting greater generality is that we must exclude private 
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 See Alcade and Dahm (2010) and Ewerhart (2015) for the complete characterization of these 
equilibria.   
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 Without loss of generality, we also assume that marginal cost equals 1.  
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information as a possibility. Thus, one can view Dubey (2013) as the private 
information analog to our model.5  
2. The model 
Two risk-neutral players compete for a prize (the objective of success) with a 
common value v. Each player 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} chooses an irreversible non-negative effort 𝑒𝑖 
from the choice set 𝑆𝑖. There are two types of choice sets: 1) a convex interval 
𝑆𝑐 = [0,∞) and 2) a non-convex subset of Sc, 𝑆𝑛𝑐(⊂ 𝑆𝑐). Other than non-convexity, 𝑆𝑛𝑐 
is completely arbitrary with no additional restrictions. For example, it may contain 
two separate convex subsets or, alternatively, may be completely discrete. The usual 
form of analysis assumes that both players have the same convex choice set. We 
instead consider two alternatives: 1) Both players have the same non-convex choice 
set; and 2) one player’s choice set is convex while the other’s is non-convex. We shall 
refer to the first situation as a symmetric strategy contest and the second as an 
asymmetric strategy contest. 
Let 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) be the probability that player 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} will win. We shall make 
use of the term contest success function (or CSF) to describe p. It is well known that 
some restrictions are needed to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium when 
identical competitors with convex strategy spaces compete.6 We retain these 
restrictions on the CSF throughout the analysis. This is done for both analytic 
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 Notice that discretization of the strategy space is shown to be important in congestion models (see 
Otsubo and Rapoport, 2008) and suitable for experiments (see Rapoport and Amaldoss, 2004). 
6
 See Dixit (1987) and Baye and Shin (1999). 
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tractability and, more importantly, to allow for a ready comparison of our results to 
those in the literature, thus ensuring that any difference depends purely on 
dropping the convexity assumption. To complete the model, we assume that 𝑝 is 
twice continuously differentiable when 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑗 > 0, and that it also satisfies the usual 
properties: 
(1) 𝑝(𝑒𝑗 , 𝑒𝑖) = 1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) and 𝑝𝑖 ≡
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0 and 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≡
𝑑2𝑝
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 < 0 in the interior of 
its domain. 
To summarize, player i's problem is: 
(2)max
𝑒𝑖
𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑖; 𝑒𝑗) such that 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , where 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) = 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗)𝑣 − 𝑒𝑖  ∀𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
The remainder of the paper characterizes the equilibria when we relax the 
assumption of continuous available strategies. In the next section, we compute the 
analog of the main results in contest theory, in a setting where the two competitors 
are identical.  
3. Symmetric strategy contests 
As a benchmark, Figure 1 illustrates the case in which strategy spaces are convex. It 
is well known that in this case there is a unique symmetric interior solution which 
we denote by 𝑒𝑐
∗.  
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Figure 1: Best response curves in the symmetric convex contest 
We now compare this to a situation in which the set of available strategies is 
identical, but non-convex. We reproduce the standard equilibrium analysis with 
only this modification as follows: First, we present Lemmas 0-2 which present 
important equilibria features and some additional technical results needed for the 
rest of the analysis. We then present Proposition 1 which shows that under quite 
reasonable conditions a constraint on the player's choice set increases competition. 
Finally, at the end of this section, Proposition 2 characterizes the complete equilibria 
structure more generally (without requiring the conditions in Proposition 1) and is 
followed by Corollary 1 which generalizes the result shown in Proposition 1.  
Our analysis therefore begins with Lemma 0. Suppose that the players' choice 
sets are S1=S2=Snc. When ec* is contained in Snc, it is trivial to show that the choice of 
ec* by both players remains an equilibrium. However, it is unclear whether the 
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deletion of strategies might also produce new equilibria. In Lemma 0, we claim that, 
regardless of the structure of Snc, no new equilibria appear, but to formally 
demonstrate this will require Lemma 1, which applies regardless of whether or not 
ec* is in Snc.7 For now, we postpone the discussion and merely note the following: 
Lemma 0 In the symmetric strategy contest, if ec* is contained in Snc, then it is the unique 
equilibrium.  
Herein we assume that ec* is not contained in Snc and do not impose any other 
restrictions on the structure of Snc.  
To this end, define 𝑒 and ?̅? to be the efforts that bracket the equilibrium point 
under convex effort. That is,  ∄𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑛𝑐|𝑒 ∈ (𝑒, ?̅?), where 0 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒𝑐
∗ ≤ ?̅?. We restrict 
what follows to the non-trivial case, in which 𝑒 and ?̅? exist.  
We are now in a position to present Lemma 1: 
Lemma 1 In a symmetric strategy contest with non-convex effort, each player‘s equilibrium 
effort is an element from the set {𝑒, ?̅?}. 
All proofs appear in the Appendix. Lemma 1 implies that, regardless of the full set of 
elements of Snc, it suffices to consider only the symmetric 2x2 contest where choice is 
limited to {𝑒, ?̅?}.8 This greatly simplifies the analysis. Also, notice that Lemma 0 
                                                          
7 In contrast to our result, Dechenaux et al. (2006) show that in a first-price all-pay auction with a 
discrete and odd strategy space, in which the largest effort is smaller than the value of the prize, there 
are multiple equilibria.  
8
 More precisely, Lemma 1 implies that the set of equilibria in the original game is a subset of the set 
of equilibria in the 2x2 game. However, it can be readily shown that these two sets coincide. Formally, 
this is demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 2. 
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follows immediately since, when ec* is contained in Snc, the set {𝑒, ?̅?} becomes a 
singleton.9   
 While Lemma 1 significantly reduces the candidates for equilibrium 
strategies, it remains to characterize the resulting set of equilibria. It proves useful to 
define a threshold effort level ?̂? with the following properties: (1) When her rival 
chooses 𝑒, a player is indifferent between choosing the threshold and 𝑒. (2) Likewise, 
when her rival chooses ?̂?, the player is again indifferent between choosing ?̂? and 𝑒. 
Formally, ?̂? solves 𝐸𝜋(?̂?, 𝑒′) = 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒′) for 𝑒′ ∈ {?̂?, 𝑒}. The expression ?̂? is well-defined 
so long as 𝑒 is not too large. Otherwise, no interior solution exists for solving the 
indifference condition. Define 𝛿 to be the maximal value of 𝑒 such that there exists a 
(weak) interior threshold, i.e. δ solves 𝐸𝜋(0, 𝑒′) = 𝐸𝜋(𝛿, 𝑒′) for 𝑒′ ∈ {0, 𝛿}. Notice that 
the left-hand side of the indifference condition takes account of the fact that the 
lowest possible threshold occurs when ?̂? = 0. Moreover, it can readily be seen that ?̂? 
is decreasing with respect to 𝑒. Lemma 2 formally establishes the properties of the 
threshold.  
Lemma 2 There exists a unique 𝛿 which is not greater than v/2. If  𝑒 ≤ 𝛿, then there exists a 
unique ?̂? ∈ [0,𝑒𝑐
∗) which is monotonically decreasing in 𝑒; otherwise ∄?̂?. 
To obtain the next result in Proposition 1, we need additional commonly used 
assumptions (taken from Skaperdas, 1996, who defined them more generally for the 
n player case), that impose technical restrictions on the CSF. The following 
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 Note that when ec* is contained in Snc, by the definition of e and 𝑒, the set {𝑒, ?̅?} is not uniquely 
defined; it can be either {𝑒𝑐
∗, ?̅?} when 𝑒𝑐
∗ < ?̅? or {𝑒, 𝑒𝑐
∗} when 𝑒 < 𝑒𝑐
∗ or {𝑒𝑐
∗}. Lemma 1 holds in all of 
these cases. 
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Assumptions 1 and 2 together require that adding a third player to the two player 
contest does not affect any two players' winning probabilities in a head to head 
contest among themselves. Loosely speaking, this can be viewed as an extended 
version of the "independence of irrelevant alternative" property (for a detailed 
explanation, see Skaperdas, 1996). In addition, Assumption 3 requires homogeneity 
in effort.  
Formally, given that a third player enter the contest, let 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) be the 
winning probability of player i where 𝑒−𝑖 is all effort except 𝑒𝑖 and pi,j her wining 
probability in the head to head contest against player j≠i for all i∈ {1,2,3}.10 Then: 
Assumption 1 𝑝𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑝(𝑒𝑖,𝑒−𝑖)  
𝑝(𝑒𝑖,𝑒−𝑖)  +𝑝(𝑒𝑗,𝑒−𝑗)  
 (see Skaperdas, 1996; A4).  
Assumption 2 𝑝𝑖,𝑗(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) = 𝑝
𝑖,𝑗(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) (see Skaperdas, 1996; A5). 
Assumption 3 𝑝(𝛼𝑒𝑖, 𝛼𝑒−𝑖) = 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) for all 𝛼 > 0 (see Skaperdas, 1996; A6). 
Note that although technically these assumptions assume the existence of a 
third player, we analyze the two player contest. Specifically, when referring to these 
assumptions, we formally consider a three player contest in which one of the players 
exert zero effort.  
We formally define "a symmetric bracketing of the strategy space" as 𝑒 − 𝑒𝑐
∗ =
𝑒𝑐
∗ − 𝑒 which allows to state the following proposition:  
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 Note that 𝑝(𝑒1, 𝑒−1) + 𝑝(𝑒2, 𝑒−2) + 𝑝(𝑒3, 𝑒−3) = 1.  
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Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, in any symmetric strategy contest with non-convex 
choices, a symmetric bracketing of the strategy space heightens competition. Specifically, the 
unique equilibrium effort in pure strategies is then 𝑒.11 
Notice that Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 2) shows that Tullok’s CSF (Tullok, 1980) is 
the only one that satisfies both (1) and Assumptions 1-3.12 This class of CSF is 
perhaps the most commonly used CSF in the literature and is formally defined as: 
(3) 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑒𝑖
𝑟
𝑒𝑖
𝑟 + 𝑒𝑗
𝑟   𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑗 > 0,
1
2
       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
}
 
 
 
 
, 
where 𝑟 ≤ 1.13 
Note that it is well known that 𝑒𝑐
∗ =
𝑟𝑣
4
 in this case.  
Proposition 1 can perhaps explain the outcome of the Washington Naval Treaty, in 
which the victors in WWI agreed to limit the arms race by imposing specific 
constraints on naval construction. However, in many ways, the development of 
aircraft carriers by the US and Japan was accelerated by these constraints, since 
budgets and hulls were now diverted from banned capital ship development to 
aircraft carriers and submarines. In particular, several American and Japanese 
carriers were constructed from battlecruiser and battleship hulls. As is well known, 
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 Notice that pi=xi/(xi+ xj) is an exception, since in that special case a symmetric bracketing of the 
strategy space results in a continuum of equilibria consisting of arbitrary weights given to {𝑒, ?̅?}. 
12
 Skaperdas (1996) axiomatize the Tullock CSF for the n-player contests. For this axiomatization, in 
addition to Assumptions 1-3, he imposes three more assumptions on p which are satisfied in (1) for 
the two player case. 
13
 More precisely, 𝑝(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒−𝑖) = {
𝑒𝑖
𝑟
∑ 𝑒𝑗
𝑟3
𝑗=1
  𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑒𝑗
3
𝑗=1 > 0,
1
3
       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
} satisfies Assumptions 1-3, where 𝑝(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗) =
𝑝(𝑒𝑖 , {𝑒𝑗 , 0}). Furthermore, note that the concavity of p, as stated in (1) (i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 0) , may be violated 
when r>1. 
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aircraft carriers turned out to be one of the deadliest weapons of the 20th century. A 
further example is perhaps the Anabolic Steroid Control Act (ASCA) passed in 1990 
which was intended to end “cheating” in sports. However, far from eliminating the 
“cheating”, it is commonly argued that the use of stronger and riskier anabolic 
steroids and performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) that clearly (and unethically) 
heighten competitive ability has proliferated since the ASCA became law.14  
Furthermore, Baye and Hoppe (2003) show that a contest with the CSF in (3) 
and a discrete strategy space is strategically equivalent to innovation tournaments 
and patent-race games.15 Therefore, the result in Proposition 1 can also shed light on 
strategic constraints in these important and commonly analyzed games.   
More generally, in Proposition 2 we characterize the equilibrium structure for 
any symmetric strategy contest and in Corollary 1 we note the sufficient and necessary 
condition under which constraints on the players' strategy space heighten 
competition.   
Proposition 2 A symmetric strategy contest with non-convex choices has a unique 
equilibrium in pure strategies:  
a. Effort is e when  𝑒>δ or ?̂? <e  
b. Effort is 𝑒 when ?̂? >e. 16 
It therefore follows that: 
                                                          
14
 See Ryvkin (2013) for a model of contests with doping.  
15
 Note that Baye and Hoppe (2003) focus on showing strategic equivalence rather than analyzing 
equilibrium behavior, therefore for the CSF in (3) and r≤2 they refer the reader to the well-known 
equilibrium of the standard convex contest.  
16
 Notice that ?̂?=e is an exception since in that special case there is a continuum of equilibria consisting 
of arbitrary weights given to {𝑒, ?̅?}. Also notice that when ?̂?≠e, if by mixing e and ?̅?  the player obtains 
an expected effort for which e and ?̅? are the best responses, then it is an equilibrium, in addition to the 
one obtained by pure strategies. However, for a given e and ?̅?, such effort may not exist. This is 
demonstrated in the proof.   
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Corollary 1 In any symmetric strategy contest with non-convex choices, constraints on the 
players' strategy space heighten competition when e<?̂?. 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 imply that a gradual deletion of effort from the choice 
set can boost effort. To see this, let ?̂? <e in which case the equilibrium effort is 𝑒. After 
deleting the equilibrium effort and its neighborhood, equilibrium usually remains at 
e. However, a sequence of such actions will eventually result in a jump to 𝑒. The 
basic intuition behind this result is related to the non-monotonic relation between 
the player's effort and her expected net payoff. In particular, Eπ(ei;ej) has an 
approximately inverted U-shape, which means that each level of Eπ(ei;ej) (apart from 
its maximum) can be obtained by responding with either of two different (non-
tangent) values of ei to ej. Furthermore, these two values of ei are negatively 
correlated, such that the smaller is the smaller of the two efforts, the larger will be 
the larger one. The result is illustrated in the following numerically simple (and 
somewhat extreme) example: 
Example 1 Assume that p(e,0)=1 for all e>0, and let Snc={0}∪[v/2+ε,v], where ε>0. 
Then, there exists an effortless peaceful equilibrium. However, if we let ε<0 (such 
that v/2+ε≥ec*), then the player exerts v/2+ε and the conflict becomes far more intense 
since there is almost full rent dissipation. 
 It is important to note that our model—unlike a model with a single decision 
maker—involves strategic interaction. In the case of a single decision maker, 
Peltzman (1975) shows that mandatory wearing of seat belts can result in riskier 
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driving. This may be the result of less effort being exerted while driving which is the 
opposite result to that of our model. In addition, although we derive conditions 
under which constraints on the players' strategy space heighten competition, we 
acknowledge that this may not always be the case. For instance, a technological 
improvement that makes it possible to manufacture a cheaper and stronger version 
of a drug such as heroin can perhaps be viewed as "a smoothing of the strategy 
space". Nevertheless, the war between the drug cartels may escalate as a result of 
that technological improvement.  
 4. Asymmetric strategy contests  
In this section, we analyze an asymmetric strategy contest in which player 1 has a 
convex choice set, i.e. S1=Sc, while player 2 has a non-convex choice set, i.e. S2=Snc.  
 Given the structure of player 1’s best response function, BR1(e2) (see Figure 1), 
and using parts of the proof of Lemma 1, Corollary 2 is immediate. 
Corollary 2 In any asymmetric strategy contest with non-convex choices: 
(i) Player 2’s equilibrium effort is an element from the set {𝑒, ?̅?}.  
(ii) The equilibrium effort in the case of  pure strategies is as follows: if 
𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) > 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?) ) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) ≥ 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)), then 
effort is (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒); if 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) ≤ 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) <
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)), then effort is  (𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?); if 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) ≤ 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) 
and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) ≥ 𝐸𝜋( ?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)), then the possible efforts are (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒) 
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and (𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?); otherwise there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in the case of 
pure strategies.  
Corollary 2 implies that in an asymmetric strategy contest, and regardless of player 2's 
full set of elements, it is sufficient to identify the signs of 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) −
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)). We restrict what follows to the 
non-trivial case, in which ?̅? < 𝑣.17  
In order to analyze the asymmetric strategy contest, we impose Assumptions 1-3 
on the CSF in the rest of this section. 
In order to characterize the equilibria in the asymmetric strategy contest, we 
need to define three threshold effort levels: (1)  𝑒𝑅 which solves 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅 , 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) −
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) = 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅 , 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)); (2) 𝑒0 which solves 
𝐸𝜋(𝑒0 , 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒0 )) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒0 )); and (3) 𝑒00  which solves 𝐸𝜋(𝑒00 , 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?) ) =
𝐸𝜋( ?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)).  
For a given ?̅?, the terms: 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) −
𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) and the resulting thresholds defined above are pictured in Figure 2 
(and formally described by Lemma 3 and Corollary 3 in the appendix) . 
                                                          
17
 Notice that 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒̅)) > 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) > 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) for all ?̅? ≥ 𝑣. 
Therefore, the equilibrium is (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒) when ?̅? ≥ 𝑣. 
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Figure 2: The shape of 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) −
𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) when 𝑟 < 1.18 
We are now in a position to characterize the set of equilibria in an asymmetric 
strategy contest with a non-convex choice space:  
Proposition 3 Given that ?̅? < 𝑣, under Assumptions 1-3, in any asymmetric strategy 
contest with non-convex choices, the Nash equilibria in pure strategies are as follows:  
a. Effort is (𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?) when 𝑒 < 𝑒0 
b. Effort is (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒) when 𝑒 > 𝑒00 
c. Otherwise, both (𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?) and (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒) are equilibrium efforts.19  
                                                          
18
 Notice that 𝑒𝑅 = 𝑒0 = 𝑒00 when 𝑟 = 1. 
19 The structure of the equilibria in which player 2 mixes pure strategies is as follows: Given that r<1, 
when 𝑒 ∈ (𝑒0, 𝑒00) there exists q∈(0,1) such that (𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒), 𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒) is an (expected) 
equilibrium, but when 𝑒 ∉ (𝑒0, 𝑒00) such an equilibrium may not exist. When r=1 and 
𝑒 = 𝑒𝑅 , (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), 𝑞𝑒𝑅 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒) is an (expected) equilibrium for all q∈(0,1).  
𝒆𝟎   𝒆𝟎𝟎 
   
𝒆𝑹 
𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?,𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)), 
𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) − 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) 
𝒓𝒗
𝟒
 
𝑒 0 
 
W
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Proposition 3 implies that, a gradual deletion of effort from the choice set can boost 
effort, as in the case of the symmetric strategy contest. However, unlike the case of the 
symmetric strategy contest, in which equilibrium in pure strategies is usually unique, 
there are two different Nash equilibria in pure strategies when 𝑒 is contained in the 
interval [𝑒0, 𝑒00], where this interval is a singleton only when the exponent r in (3) is 
equal to 1. 
Notice that player 2 will always prefer to have a convex choice set of efforts, or 
more precisely, to be able to choose ec*. This is because in the symmetric convex 
contest, commitment has no value, and therefore a player does not benefit from any 
type of bracketing in the strategy space (Dixit, 1987; Baik and Shogren, 1992; 
Possajennikov, 2009).20 Nevertheless, in an asymmetric strategy contest, a player will 
prefer to be constrained in some circumstances. To see this, consider the following: 
When the equilibrium effort is (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒), player 1’s expected net payoff is larger 
than her rival’s (and even larger than the payoff in the standard symmetric convex 
contest).21 Indeed, in this case, player 1 benefits from the "handicap" of her rival. 
However, this may not be the case when equilibrium effort is (𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?). We 
demonstrate this in example 2.  
                                                          
20
 For other studies on commitment in contests, see Várdy (2004); Yildrim (2005); Morgan and Várdy 
(2007). 
21
 Given that 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒) > 𝑒 and 
𝜕𝐸π(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
< 0, and given the definition of 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝐸π(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒) >
𝐸π(𝑒, 𝑒) > 𝐸π (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) and 𝐸π(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒), 𝑒) > 𝐸π(𝑒, 𝑒) > 𝐸π(𝑒𝑐
∗, 𝑒𝑐
∗). 
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Example 2 Consider the CSF in (3) when r=1, and let v=1 and 𝑆2 = {0,9/16}. Then 
(𝑒1
∗, 𝑒2
∗) = (
3
16
,
9
16
) and (𝐸𝜋1
∗, 𝐸𝜋2
∗) = (
1
16
,
3
16
). Thus, player 2’s expected net payoff is 
larger than player 1‘s.22 
 In the next section, we generalize our results but also note some 
qualifications.    
5. Non-convex strategy contests with approximately identical players 
One might attribute the "jumps" in effort to the assumption of identical players 
(apart from the asymmetry in the choice sets presented in section 4). Indeed, such 
jumps might not occur when the difference between the players is sufficiently large. 
For instance, a significant difference in prize valuation probably results in a "sticky" 
equilibrium, in which small changes in available strategies are irrelevant to the 
players' behavior. However, this is not the case with smaller asymmetries. In 
particular, while focusing on pure strategies, Proposition 4 generalizes the results of 
Proposition 2 to the case in which there is a small difference in the players' prize 
valuation. We subsequently discuss the intuition behind this result and show that it 
applies to other parameters of the model as well. 
Proposition 4 When ?̂?≠e, there exists a neighborhood V of v such that if e* is the 
equilibrium effort in a symmetric strategy contest over a prize with a common value of v, 
                                                          
22
 Notice that 𝐵𝑅1 (
9
16
) = √
9
16
−
9
16
=
3
16
. Furthermore, it is also possible that (𝑒1
∗, 𝑒2
∗) = (𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?) and 
player 1’s expected net payoff will be larger than player 2’s. In particular, this can happen when r, the 
exponent in the CSF in (3), is sufficiently small (such that p1≈p2 and e1<e2). 
20 
 
then it is the equilibrium effort in the corresponding contest in which both players' prize 
valuation is in V.23 
The logic behind the result in Proposition 4 is as follows: the value of the player's 
"continuous best response function" at any given equilibrium shown in Proposition 2 
(i.e., BR(e) for eϵ{e,?̅?}) is always between e and ?̅?. Therefore, given the bracketing of 
the strategy space and that BRi(ej) is continuous in player i's prize valuation, a small 
change in this valuation will not change her best available response. The same logic 
applies to Proposition 3 and for small changes in the player's cost and effectiveness 
of effort.   
As noted at the beginning of this section, a sufficient degree of asymmetry may 
lead to completely different equilibria. For instance, consider the following example: 
Example 3 Assume the CSF in (3) when r=1, and let the valuations of the prize by 
players 1 and 2' be 1 and 2, respectively. When both players face a convex strategy 
space, the equilibrium efforts are {𝑒𝑐,1
∗ , 𝑒𝑐,2
∗ } = {
2
9
,
4
9
}. Now consider a symmetric strategy 
contest in which 𝑆𝑛𝑐 = {0,
1
9
,
1
5
,
5
9
} and therefore 𝑒
1
= 𝑒
2
=
1
5
 and 𝑒1 = 𝑒2 =
5
9
. In this 
contest, the equilibrium efforts are  {𝑒1
∗ , 𝑒2
∗} = {
1
9
,
5
9
} and therefore 𝑒1
∗ ∉ {𝑒, ?̅?}. This 
implies that when players have sufficiently different prize valuations, Lemma 1 may 
not hold, even when both players are subject to the same bracketing of the strategy 
space. Furthermore, holding everything else constant, let the largest element in the 
                                                          
23
 In the special case in which ?̂?=e, there exists a deleted neighborhood V of v such that equilibrium is 
unique, where each player's effort is an element from the set {𝑒, 𝑒}. The specific effort depends on the 
prize valuation of the players.  
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strategy space be 2/3 instead of 5/9. In this case, there is no Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies. Thus, unlike in the common valuation case, Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies may not exist when prize valuations are sufficiently different.  
We therefore note that there are qualifications that apply to the results when the 
players are significantly different. 
6. Conclusion  
We characterized Nash equilibria in the case of contests in which the convexity 
assumption of the strategy space has been relaxed. Although the model is quite 
stylized, it extends models in the literature which generally assume a convex 
strategy space. The main implication of the results—and one that seems 
counterintuitive—is that constraints on the players' strategies can heighten 
competition. Nonetheless, the result is consistent with anecdotal evidence. 
Furthermore, in the first-price all-pay auction, it has been shown that excluding the 
set of players that mostly evaluates the prize (Baye et al., 1993), or putting caps on 
players' expenditure, (Che and Gale, 1993) actually increases aggregate expenditure. 
Therefore, although we analyzed a different class of contests, in a sense, our results 
complement the existing literature on contests that shows that different types of 
constraints on players may heighten competition.  It is also shown that a constraint 
on a strategy space can benefit a player.  
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Appendix: 
Proof of Lemma 1: It is well known that in the standard symmetric strategy convex 
contest, player i’s best response function, BRi(ej) (pictured in Figure 1), has the 
following property:24  
(A.1)  𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑗)
>
<
𝑒𝑗 ↔ 𝑒𝑗
<
>
𝑒𝑐
∗  ∀𝑒𝑗 > 0, 
which implies that: 
 (A.2)  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑗) = 𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑐
∗) = 𝑒𝑐
∗. 
Thus, it is immediate that in a symmetric strategy non-convex contest, any 
equilibrium effort e satisfies: 
(A.3)  𝑒 ≤ ?̅?. 
                                                          
24
 For example, see equation (8) in Dixit (1987) and Baik and Shogren (1992). 
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Given that 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑖; 𝑒𝑗) is concave in 𝑒𝑖 in the interior of its domain and therefore, for a 
given 𝑒𝑗 > 0, 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑗); 𝑒𝑗) is the unique maximum of 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑖; 𝑒𝑗), it is immediate from 
(A.1) that: 
(A.4) 𝐸𝜋(𝑥, 𝑥) > 𝐸𝜋(𝑦, 𝑥) ∀ 𝑒𝑐
∗ ≥ 𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0. 
We now present the following important identity:25 
(A.5) 𝐸𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) − 𝐸𝜋(𝑦, 𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑣 + 𝑦 − (
𝑣
2
+ 𝑥) 
                     =
𝑣
2
− 𝑥 − (𝑣(1 − 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)) − 𝑦) = 𝐸𝜋(𝑥, 𝑥) − 𝐸𝜋(𝑦, 𝑥). 
Applying (A.5) to (A.4) results in: 
(A.6) 𝐸𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝐸𝜋(𝑦, 𝑦) ∀ 𝑒𝑐
∗ ≥ 𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0.  
The rest of the proof is carried out in two steps: In the first, we restrict the analysis to 
pure strategies, and, in the second, we extend the analysis to mixed strategies.  
We thus begin by assuming that the player restricts her actions to pure 
strategies. In what follows, we show that the equilibrium effort cannot be smaller 
than e. Let 𝑒 ≥ 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦 ≥ 0. By (A.4) and (A.6), (x,y) can be an equilibrium only when 
y=x=e. Moreover, if y<e, then (ē,y) cannot be an equilibrium either. This can be 
shown by contradiction: Assume for now that (ē,y) is an equilibrium. Then, by (A.5), 
𝐸𝜋(𝑦, 𝑦) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝑦), but by (A.6), 𝐸𝜋(𝑦, 𝑦) < 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑦) and thus 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑦) > 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝑦), 
which contradicts the initial assumption that (ē,y) is an equilibrium. Thus, (y,e) 
                                                          
25
 Note that (A.5) implies that in a symmetric contest where choice is limited to a set of two effort 
levels, there always exists a dominant (possibly weak) strategy. As far as we know, this result is 
presented here for the first time and may have wider applications beyond the scope of this paper. 
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cannot be an equilibrium for any 𝑒 ∈ {𝑆𝑛𝑐 |𝑒 ≤ 𝑒} and y<e. Given (A.3), this implies 
that in a symmetric strategy non-convex contest equilibrium: 
(A.7)  𝑒 ≥ 𝑒. 
By (A.3) and (A.7), when the player is restricted to pure strategies, her equilibrium 
effort can only be an element from the set {e,ē}.  
We now proceed to the second step of the proof, in which the player can mix 
pure strategies. We show that such an equilibrium can only exist when the player 
mixes e and ?̅?. Assume that the expected equilibrium is (qa+(1-q)b,q’c+(1-q’)d), where 
0<q,q’<1, and without loss of generality, a>b and c>d. Given that for ej>0, Eπ(ei;ej) is 
concave in ei with a unique maximum at Eπ(BRi(ej);ej) (henceforth referred to as "the 
structure of Eπi"), it is immediate that: 
a>BRi(q’c+(1-q’)d)>b  
and  
c>BRi(qa+(1-q)b)>d. 
  Notice that when a=c (and therefore b=d), all pairs in Snc other than (b,a)=(e,?̅?) 
can be deleted. First, it must be that a>ec*, since otherwise, by (A.6), Eπ(a,qa+(1-
q)b)>Eπ(b,qa+(1-q)b) when a>b. Therefore, given (A.3), it is only possible that a=?̅?. We 
now show by contradiction that it is only possible that b=e when a=c (and b=d); 
Assume for now that b<e. Given that ?̅?>BRi(q?̅?+(1-q)b)>b, by the structure of Eπ(ei;ej), 
either BRi(q?̅?+(1-q)b)>e>b and thus Eπ(e,q?̅?+(1-q)b)> Eπ(b,q?̅?+(1-q)b) or ?̅?>e>BRi(q?̅?+(1-
25 
 
q)b)>b and thus Eπ(e,q?̅?+(1-q)b)>Eπ(?̅?,q?̅?+(1-q)b). In the first option, b is not a best 
response to q?̅?+(1-q)b and in the second ?̅? is not a best response to q?̅?+(1-q)b.  
Now let a≠c (and therefore b≠d). Then, either b>c or d>a; otherwise, given the 
structure of Eπi, it is impossible that both a and b are the best responses to q’c+(1-q’)d, 
and c and d are the best responses to qa+(1-q)b.26  
Without loss of generality, let b>c. Then:  
a>BRi(q’c+(1-q’)d)>b>c>BRi(qa+(1-q)b)>d.  
Thus, by the structure of Eπi, 
Eπ(a,q’c+(1-q’)d)=(b,q’c+(1-q’)d)>Eπ(q’c+(1-q’)d,q’c+(1-q’)d) 
→ 
Eπ(qa+(1-q)b,q’c+(1-q’)d)>Eπ(q’c+(1-q’)d,q’c+(1-q’)d), 
where by (A.5), 
Eπ(qa+(1-q)b,q’c+(1-q’)d)>Eπ(q’c+(1-q’)d,q’c+(1-q’)d) 
↔ 
Eπ(qa+(1-q)b,qa+(1-q)b)>Eπ(q’c+(1-q’)d,qa+(1-q)b). 
However, the structure of Eπi when b>c also implies that: 
Eπ(d,qa+(1-q)b)=Eπ(c,qa+(1-q)b)>Eπ(qa+(1-q)b,qa+(1-q)b)  
                                                          
26 For instance, if d<b<a<c, then it is not possible that both c and d are the best responses to qa+(1-q)b; 
rather, either c>BRi(qa+(1-q)b)>a and therefore Eπ(a,qa+(1-q)b)>Eπ(d,qa+(1-q)b) or b>BRi(qa+(1-q)b)>d 
and therefore Eπ(b,qa+(1-q)b)>Eπ(c,qa+(1-q)b) or a>BRi(qa+(1-q)b)>b and therefore both Eπ(a,qa+(1-
q)b)>Eπ(c,qa+(1-q)b) and Eπ(b,qa+(1-q)b)>Eπ(d,qa+(1-q)b). A similar argument can be shown for any 
partition of a,b,c and d such that neither b>c nor d>a.       
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→  
Eπ(q’c+(1-q’)d,qa+(1-q)b)>Eπ(qa+(1-q)b,qa+(1-q)b), 
a contradiction.27          QED 
Proof of Lemma 2: Given (A.5), 
(A.8) 𝐸𝜋(?̂?, ?̅?) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̅?) 
              ↔ 
             𝐸𝜋(?̂?, ?̂?) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̂?) 
                             ↔ 
                  
𝑣
2
− ?̂? = 𝑝(?̅?, ?̂?)𝑣 − ?̅?.  
Substituting ?̂? = 0 into (A.8) results in: 
(A.9)  𝐸𝜋(0,0) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 0) 
  ↔ 
                ?̅? = 𝑣 (𝑝(?̅?, 0) −
1
2
).  
Notice that 𝑝(?̅?, 0) ≤ 1 and thus the RHS of the second equality in (A.9) is bounded 
from above by 
𝑣
2
, where at ?̅? =
𝑣
2
 the LHS equals to 
𝑣
2
. Also, by (A.5), 𝐸𝜋(0, 𝑒𝑐
∗) <
𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑐
∗, 𝑒𝑐
∗) ↔ 𝐸𝜋(0,0) < 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑐
∗, 0), which implies that at ?̅? = 𝑒𝑐
∗ the LHS of the second 
equality in (A.9) is smaller than the RHS (i.e., 𝑒𝑐
∗ < 𝑣 (𝑝(𝑒𝑐
∗, 0) −
1
2
)). Therefore, since 
the LHS in the second equality of  (A.9) is increasing and linear in ?̅? and the RHS is 
non-decreasing and weakly concave in 𝑒,̅ 28 by the Intermediate Value Theorem, 
there exists a unique ?̅? ≡ 𝛿 ∈ (𝑒𝑐
∗,
𝑣
2
] that solves (A.9) such that 
                                                          
27
 Notice that this argument holds also when q or q’ equals zero or one.  
28
 Since 𝑝(?̅?, 𝜀) is increasing and concave in ?̅? for 𝜀 > 0 and continuous in 𝜀, 𝑝(?̅?, 0) must be non-
decreasing in ?̅?. 
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?̅?
>
<
𝛿 ↔ 𝐸𝜋(0,0)
>
<
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 0). Thus, since for a given ?̅? both sides of the third equality of 
(A.8) are decreasing in ?̂? while the LHS is linear and the RHS is convex, and by 
definition 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑐
∗, 𝑒𝑐
∗) > 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝑒𝑐
∗) for all ?̅? > 𝑒𝑐
∗ which implies that 
𝑣
2
− 𝑒𝑐
∗ ≥ 𝑝(?̅?, 𝑒𝑐
∗)𝑣 −
?̅?,  there exists a unique ?̂? over the interval [0,𝑒𝑐
∗) such that 𝑒
>
<
?̂?  ↔  𝐸𝜋(?̂?, ?̂?)
>
<
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̂?)  
iff  ?̅? ≤ 𝛿.29 Given that 𝑝(?̅?, ?̂?)𝑣 − ?̅? is decreasing in ?̅? and  
𝑣
2
− ?̂? is independent of ?̅?, ?̂? 
is monotonically decreasing in ?̅?.       QED 
Proof of Proposition 1: Let ?̅? − 𝑒𝑐
∗ = 2𝛽∆ and 𝑒𝑐
∗ − ?̂? = 2(1 − 𝛽)∆,  where 0 < 𝛽 < 1. 
Then, by the definition of ?̂?: 
(A.10) 𝐸𝜋(?̂?, ?̂?) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̂?) 
↔ 
𝑣 (𝑝(?̅?, ?̂?) −
1
2
) = 2∆ 
↔ 
𝑝(?̅?, ?̂?) =
𝑣+4∆
2𝑣
 ∀?̅? ≤ 𝛿.  
Substituting (A.10) into 
𝑝(?̂?,?̅?)
𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
=
1−𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
=
1
𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
− 1 results in: 
(A.11) 
𝑝(?̂?,?̅?)
𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
=
𝑣−4∆
𝑣+4∆
 ∀?̅? ≤ 𝛿. 
Note that (A.11) holds by definition. Also, by Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 2), 
Assumptions 1-3 together with (1) imply that the CSF has the functional form shown 
in (3), which also, by definition, implies that: 
                                                          
29
 This is due to the Intermediate Value Theorem, since iff ?̅? < 𝛿 then 𝐸𝜋(0,0) < 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 0). 
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(A.12)  
𝑝(?̂?,?̅?)
𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
= (
?̂?
?̅?
)𝑟 = (
𝑒𝑐
∗−2(1−𝛽)∆
𝑒𝑐
∗+2𝛽∆
)𝑟 = (
𝑟𝑣
4
−2(1−𝛽)∆
𝑟𝑣
4
+2𝛽∆
)𝑟 = (
𝑟𝑣−8(1−𝛽)∆
𝑟𝑣+8𝛽∆
)𝑟 ∀?̅? ≤ 𝛿. 
By Lemma 2, for a given ?̅?(≤ 𝛿) there exists a unique ?̂?, obtained by the 
corresponding unique β that solves (A.12) (i.e., at this β, (
?̂?
?̅?
)𝑟 = (
𝑟𝑣−8(1−𝛽)∆
𝑟𝑣+8𝛽∆
)𝑟).30 It 
follows that only at this specific β is the RHS of (A.12) identical to that of (A.11). 
Assuming that β=1/2, by (A.12) we obtain that: 
(A.13)  
𝑝(?̂?,?̅?)
𝑝(?̅?,?̂?)
= (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)𝑟 ∀?̅? ≤ 𝛿. 
Notice that at r=1 (A.13) is identical to (A.11) and therefore, in this case, β=1/2 solves 
(A.12) and uniquely satisfies the definition of ?̂?. For r<1, both 
𝑣−4∆
𝑣+4∆
 and (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝛼𝑣+4∆
)𝑟 are 
decreasing in ∆ and equal to 1 at ∆= 0,  however, 
𝑣−4∆
𝑣+4∆
> (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)𝑟 over the interval ∆∈
(0,
𝑟𝑣
4
]; notice that (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)𝑟|
𝑟=1
=
𝑣−4∆
𝑣+4∆
  where 
𝑑(
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)𝑟
𝑑𝑟
> 0 for r≤1 and ∆∈ (0,
𝑟𝑣
4
)31 , and 
𝑣−4∆
𝑣+4∆
|
∆=
𝑟𝑣
4
> (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)𝑟|
∆=
𝑟𝑣
4
 for r<1. Thus, since (
𝑟𝑣−8(1−𝛽)∆
𝑟𝑣+8𝛽∆
)𝑟 is increasing in β, the unique 
β that solves (A.12) for a given ?̅?(≤ 𝛿) (and therefore uniquely satisfies the definition 
                                                          
30
 Notice that, by definition, ?̅? −  ?̂? = 2∆. Thus, since for a given ?̅?(≤ 𝛿), ?̂? is unique, ∆ is also unique. 
Therefore, given that ?̂? is defined as: ?̂? = 𝑒𝑐
∗ − 2(1 − 𝛽)∆, for a given ?̅?, ?̂? is obtained by a unique β.   
31
 For ∆∈ [0,
𝑟𝑣
4
), 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑑(
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)𝑟
𝑑𝑟
= 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(ln (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
) +
8𝑟𝑣∆
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
). Therefore, 
𝑑(
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
)
𝑟
𝑑𝑟
> 0 ↔ − ln (
𝑟𝑣−4∆
𝑟𝑣+4∆
) <
8𝑟𝑣∆
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
↔ ln (
𝑟𝑣+4∆
𝑟𝑣−4∆
) <
8𝑟𝑣∆
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
, which hold for all ∆∈ (0,
𝑟𝑣
4
); Notice that ln (
𝑟𝑣+4∆
𝑟𝑣−4∆
)|
∆=0
=
8𝑟𝑣∆
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
|
∆=0
, and  
𝑑 ln(
𝑟𝑣+4∆
𝑟𝑣−4∆
)
𝑑∆
=
8𝑟𝑣
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
 and  
𝑑
8𝑟𝑣∆
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
𝑑∆
=
8𝑟𝑣((𝑟𝑣)2+16∆2)
((𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2)2
 where 
8𝑟𝑣
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
<
8𝑟𝑣((𝑟𝑣)2+16∆2)
((𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2)2
↔
1 <
(𝑟𝑣)2+16∆2
(𝑟𝑣)2−16∆2
 which hold for all ∆∈ (0,
𝑟𝑣
4
). 
 
29 
 
of ?̂?) must be greater than half when r<1. It follows that e<?̂? when 𝑒 − 𝑒𝑐
∗ = 𝑒𝑐
∗ − 𝑒.32 
By Proposition 2, ?̅? is the equilibrium effort when e<?̂?.  QED 
Proof of Proposition 2: By (A.5), the player‘s equilibrium effort in the symmetric 
2x2 contest where choice is limited to {𝑒, ?̅?} is determined by the following inequality: 
(A.14) 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, ?̅?)
>
<
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̅?) 
                         ↔ 
                           𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒)
>
<
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝑒). 
According to the proof of Lemma 2, if ?̅? > 𝛿 then 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒) > 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝑒) for all 
𝑒; otherwise 𝑒
>
<
?̂? ↔ 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒)
>
<
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝑒). Lemma 1 implies that the set of equilibria in 
the original contest is a subset of the set of equilibria in the 2x2 contest. In the 
following, it is shown that these two sets coincide. By (A.3) and (A.4), if (𝑒, 𝑒) is an 
equilibrium in the 2x2 contest, then it is an equilibrium in the original contest. In 
addition, if (?̅?, ?̅?) is an equilibrium in the 2x2 contest, then 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̅?) ≥ 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, ?̅?) and 
therefore by the structure of Eπi, ?̅?>BRi(?̅?)>e which also implies that 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, ?̅?) ≥
𝐸𝜋(𝑒, ?̅?) > 𝐸𝜋(𝑦, ?̅?) for all y<e and therefore given (A.3), if (?̅?, ?̅?) is an equilibrium in 
the 2x2 contest, then it is also an equilibrium in the original contest.33  QED 
                                                          
32
 Notice that, for the CSF in (3), 𝛿=1/2 and ec*=rv/4. Therefore, when r≤1, 𝑒 ≤ 𝛿 for all 𝑒 such that 
𝑒 − 𝑒𝑐
∗ = 𝑒𝑐
∗ − 𝑒.   
33
 Notice that in addition to the equilibrium in the case of pure strategies determined by the inequality 
in (A.14), an equilibrium may exist in mixed strategies. More precisely, if there exists a convex 
combination qe+(1-q)?̅?, 0<q<1 for which the player’s best responses are e and ?̅?, then it is an 
equilibrium in the case of mixed strategies. Such an equilibrium can be constructed as follows: Pick a 
tuple (a,c,b) such that a<ec*, c<b and Eπ(a,c)=Eπ(b,c), and let a=e and b=?̅?. Then, c=qa+(1-q)b is the 
player's expected equilibrium effort. However, for a given e and ?̅?, such an equilibrium may not exist. 
For instance, by the continuity of Eπi in the interior of its domain, the player always prefers 
responding with e rather than ?̅? to any convex combination of e= ec*-ε and a sufficiently large ?̅?. 
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Proof of Corollary 2: The behavior of player 1 described in (A.1) and the behavior of 
player 2 described in (A.3), (A.4) and (A.6) result in Corollary 2.   QED 
Proof of Proposition 3: As in the proof of Proposition 1, we note that by Skaperdas 
(1996, Theorem 2), Assumptions 1-3 together with (1) imply that the CSF has the 
functional form shown in (3). Therefore, in the rest of the proof we consider this CSF.  
We first present an auxiliary lemma (Lemma 3) and a corollary that follows 
from it (Corollary 3) to describe the structure of the terms 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) −
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) − 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)). The rest of the proof is almost 
trivial.  
Lemma 3 For a given ?̅? < 𝑣:  
(i) 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) is concave with an interior maximum point 
over the interval 𝑒 ∈ [0,
𝑟𝑣
4
], where 𝐸𝜋(0, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?))  = ?̅? −
𝑣𝑝(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (
𝑟𝑣
4
, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) ≥ 0.  
(ii) 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) − 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) is monotonically increasing over the interval 
𝑒 ∈ (0,
𝑟𝑣
4
], where 𝐸𝜋(0, 𝐵𝑅1(0)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(0))  ≈ ?̅? − 𝑣 and 
𝐸𝜋 (
𝑟𝑣
4
, 𝐵𝑅1 (
𝑟𝑣
4
)) − 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1 (
𝑟𝑣
4
))  ≥ 0. 
(iii) There exists a unique 𝑒𝑅 ∈ (0,
𝑟𝑣
4
). If r<1 (r=1), then 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅 , 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒′)) <
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒′)) (𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅 , 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒′)) = 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒′) ))  for  𝑒
′ ∈ {𝑒𝑅 , 𝑒}. 
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Proof of Lemma 3i: For a given ?̅?, 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) is constant and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) is 
concave over the interval 𝑒 ∈ [0,
𝑟𝑣
4
], where 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) = 𝐸𝜋 (𝐵𝑅1(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)), 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)). Also, (A.2) implies that 
𝐸𝜋 (
𝑟𝑣
4
, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) > 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)).   
Proof of Lemma 3ii: Notice that: 
(A.15) 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) =
𝑣𝑒𝑟
𝑒𝑟+(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑟 − 𝑒. 
Notice that, for 𝑒 > 0, BR1(e) satisfies player 1’s FOC for an interior maximum and 
therefore:  
(A.16)  
𝜕𝐸𝜋1(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒),𝑒)
𝜕𝑒1
= 
𝑟(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑟−1
𝑒𝑟
(𝑒𝑟+(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑟
)
2 𝑣 − 1 = 0  
       ↔ 
𝑣𝑒𝑟 =
(𝑒𝑟 + (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑟
)
2
𝑟(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑟−1
 ∀𝑒 > 0. 
Substituting the RHS of (A.16) into the nominator of the first term in the RHS of 
(A.15) results in: 
(A.17)  𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) =
1
𝑟
(𝑒𝑟 + (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑟
)(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
1−𝑟
− 𝑒 
  =
1
𝑟
(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒) + 𝑒
𝑟 (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
1−𝑟
) − 𝑒 ∀𝑒 > 0.  
Taking the derivative of (A.17) with respect to e yields: 
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(A.18) 
𝑑𝐸𝜋(𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑑𝑒
=
1
𝑟
(
𝑑𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
+ 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
𝑒
)
1−𝑟
+ (1 − 𝑟) (
𝑒
𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
)
𝑟
𝑑𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
)− 1                     
 = (
𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
𝑒
)
1−𝑟
− 1 +
1
𝑟
𝑑𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
(1 + (1 − 𝑟) (
𝑒
𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
)
𝑟
) ∀𝑒 > 0. 
By (A.1), 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒) > 𝑒 and 
𝑑𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
> 0, and thus, by (A.18), 
𝑑𝐸𝜋(𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))
𝑑𝑒
≥ 0 ∀𝑒 > 0. 
Given that 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒) is increasing in 𝑒, 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) is decreasing in 𝑒. Therefore, 
𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))− 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) is increasing in 𝑒 for all 𝑒 ≥ 0.34 Notice also that 
𝐸𝜋(0,𝐵𝑅1(0))− 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) = ?̅? −
?̅?
?̅?+𝜀
𝑣 ≈ ?̅? − 𝑣. 
Proof of Lemma 3iii: We prove Lemma 3iii in two steps: First, we show that there 
exists a unique 𝑒𝑅 ∈ [0,
𝑟𝑣
4
) and then we find the sign of 
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))−𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)). 
 We thus begin by proving that there exists a unique 𝑒𝑅: 
(A.19)  𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?))− 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) 
= 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅 , 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) − 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))   
                       ↔ 
𝑝(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − 𝑝(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) = 𝑝(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) − 𝑝(?̅?,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅) 
                       ↔ 
1 − 𝑝(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) − (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?))) = 1 − 𝑝(?̅?,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)− (1− 𝑝(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)))   
                        ↔ 
𝑝(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?) − 𝑝(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), 𝑒𝑅) = 𝑝(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), ?̅?) − 𝑝(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), 𝑒𝑅) 
                        ↔ 
                                                          
34
 Notice that, 𝐵𝑅1(0) = 𝜀 and thus 𝐸𝜋(0, 𝐵𝑅1(0)) = 0 while 𝐸𝜋(𝜀, 𝐵𝑅1(𝜀)) > 0 for 𝜀 > 0. This implies 
that, 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) − 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) is increasing in e at e=0 despite the discontinuity of 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒) at 
e=0. 
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𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?)− 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), ?̅?) = 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), 𝑒𝑅)− 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), 𝑒𝑅) 
                        ↔ 
                   𝐵𝑅1(?̅?) = 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅). 35   
By the structure of 𝐵𝑅𝑖 described in (A.1)36, for any given ?̅? ∈ (
𝑟𝑣
4
, 𝑣],  there exists a 
unique 𝑒𝑅 ∈ [0,
𝑟𝑣
4
) that solves 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?) = 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅). 
We now proceed to find the sign of 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) − 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)). By the 
FOC for maximization of player 1: 
(A.20) 
𝜕𝑝(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?),?̅?)
𝜕𝑒1
=
𝜕𝑝(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅),𝑒𝑅)
𝜕𝑒1
 
↔ 
?̅?𝑟
(?̅?𝑟 + (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))
𝑟)
2
=
𝑒𝑅
𝑟
(𝑒𝑅𝑟 + (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))
𝑟)
2
 
↔ 
(𝑒𝑅
𝑟 + (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))
𝑟)√?̅?𝑟 = (?̅?𝑟 + (𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))
𝑟)√𝑒𝑅𝑟 
↔ 
((𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))
𝑟 −√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)𝑟)(√?̅?𝑟 −√𝑒𝑅𝑟) = 0 
↔ 
𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅) = √?̅?𝑒𝑅. 
 Substituting 𝑒 = 𝑒𝑅 and (A.20) into (A.16) results in:  
(A.21)   
𝑟(√?̅?𝑒𝑅)
𝑟−1
𝑒𝑅
𝑟
(𝑒𝑅𝑟+√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)
𝑟)
2 𝑣 = 1 
                                                          
35
 Notice that 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), ?̅?) > 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), ?̅?) and 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(?̅?), 𝑒𝑅) < 𝐸𝜋(𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅), 𝑒𝑅) when 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?) ≠
𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅). 
36
 Over the interval (0,v), 𝐵𝑅𝑖  is positive and has an approximate inverted U-shape with a unique 
maximum at  𝑟v/4. See Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) for a detailed analysis of the reaction 
functions in the Tullock contest. 
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          ↔ 
𝑟(√?̅?𝑒𝑅)
𝑟−1
(√𝑒𝑅
𝑟 +√?̅?𝑟)
2
𝑣 = 1 
          ↔ 
 𝑟(√?̅?𝑒𝑅)
𝑟−1𝑣 = (√?̅?𝑟 +√𝑒𝑅
𝑟)2. 
Also, substituting (A.20) into 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))− 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) results in: 
(A.22)  𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))− 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) 
= (
?̅?𝑟
?̅?𝑟 +√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)𝑟
−
𝑒𝑅
𝑟
𝑒𝑅𝑟 +√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)𝑟
)𝑣 − (?̅? − 𝑒𝑅) 
   = (
√?̅?𝑟
√?̅?𝑟+√𝑒𝑅
𝑟
−
√𝑒𝑅
𝑟
√?̅?𝑟+√𝑒𝑅
𝑟
)𝑣 − (?̅? − 𝑒𝑅) =
√?̅?𝑟−√𝑒𝑅
𝑟
√?̅?𝑟+√𝑒𝑅
𝑟
𝑣 − (?̅? − 𝑒𝑅) 
=
?̅?𝑟 − 𝑒𝑅
𝑟
(√?̅?𝑟 +√𝑒𝑅
𝑟)2
𝑣 − (?̅? − 𝑒𝑅). 
Assuming that r≠0, substituting the LHS of (A.21) into the denominator of the first 
term of (A.22) results in: 
(A.23) 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))− 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) 
=
?̅?𝑟−𝑒𝑅
𝑟
𝑟√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)𝑟−1
− (?̅? − 𝑒𝑅), where  
(A.24) 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
?̅?𝑟−𝑒𝑅
𝑟
𝑟√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)𝑟−1
− (?̅? − 𝑒𝑅)) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
?̅?𝑟−𝑒𝑅
𝑟
(?̅?−𝑒𝑅)√(?̅?𝑒𝑅)𝑟−1
− 𝑟) 
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= 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(
?̅?𝑟 − 𝑒𝑅
𝑟
(?̅? − 𝑒𝑅)(?̅?𝑒𝑅)
−
1
2(?̅?𝑒𝑅)
𝑟
2
− 𝑟) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
(
 
 ?̅?𝑟 − 𝑒𝑅
𝑟
((
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
1
2
− (
𝑒𝑅
?̅? )
1
2
)(?̅?𝑒𝑅)
𝑟
2
− 𝑟
)
 
 
 
= 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
(
 
 (
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
− (
𝑒𝑅
?̅? )
𝑟
2
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
1
2
− (
𝑒𝑅
?̅? )
1
2
− 𝑟
)
 
 
. 
Notice that 
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
−(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
𝑟
2
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
1
2
−(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
1
2
= 1 at r=1, and 
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
−(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
𝑟
2
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
1
2
−(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
1
2
→ 0 when r →0. Since 
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
−(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
𝑟
2
(
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
1
2
−(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
1
2
  is 
increasing and convex with respect to r over the interval 𝑟 ∈ (0,1]37, if 𝑟 ∈ (0,1) then 
𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅))− 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) < 0. 38      QED 
Lemma 3 implies the following corollary: 
Corollary 3 Given ?̅? < 𝑣, there exists a unique tuple (𝑒0 ,𝑒00 ,eR). If r<1 (r=1), then 𝑒00 >
𝑒0 > eR (𝑒00 = 𝑒0 = eR). 
By Corollary 2, Lemma 3 and Corollary 3, the Nash equilibria in the case of pure 
strategies shown in Proposition 3 is straightforward. Regarding equilibria in the case 
of mixed strategies: At 𝑞 = 1, 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒))− 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒)) =
𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑒))− 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)), and at 
𝑞 = 0,𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒))− 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒)) = 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(?̅?))−
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 Since ?̅? > 𝑒𝑅, then  (
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
1
2− (𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
1
2
 , which is independent of r, is also positive. Define 𝑍(𝑟) = (
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
−
(
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
𝑟
2
; then  
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑟
=
1
2
𝑙𝑛 (
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
) ((
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
+ (
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
𝑟
2
) > 0 and 
𝑑2𝑧
𝑑𝑟2
=
1
4
(𝑙𝑛 (
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
))2((
?̅?
𝑒𝑅
)
𝑟
2
− (
𝑒𝑅
?̅?
)
𝑟
2
) > 0. 
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 Notice that by (A.18), 𝐸𝜋(𝑒̅, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) − 𝐸𝜋(𝑒𝑅 , 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒𝑅)) = 𝑒𝑅 − ?̅? < 0 at r=0. 
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𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)). Since when 𝑟 < 1 and 𝑒 ∈ (𝑒0, 𝑒00), by Lemma 3 and Corollary 
2, 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) < 𝐸𝜋(?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(?̅?)) and 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)) > 𝐸𝜋 (?̅?, 𝐵𝑅1(𝑒)), by the 
Intermediate Value Theorem there exists 𝑞 ∈ (0,1) such that 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 +
(1 − 𝑞)𝑒)) = 𝐸𝜋 (𝑒,𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒)). When 𝑒 is not contained in (𝑒0, 𝑒00), the two 
expressions above do not have opposite signs and therefore an equilibrium in the 
case of mixed strategies may not exist.39 The proof for the case in which 𝑟 = 1 is 
trivial.          QED  
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume for the moment that both players' prize valuation is v 
and the unique equilibrium effort is e. By the proof of Proposition 2, 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒) >
𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒)∀𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ≠ 𝑒, and by (A.1) and (A.2), 𝐵𝑅(𝑒) ∈ (𝑒, 𝑒) where by definition 
∄𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ∈ (𝑒, 𝑒). Now, let vi be player i's prize valuation for all iϵ{1,2}. By the 
continuity of Eπi and therefore of BRi(ej) in vi, there exists a neighborhood V of v for 
which 𝐸𝜋𝑖(𝑒, 𝑒) > 𝐸𝜋𝑖(𝑒, 𝑒) ∀𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ≠ 𝑒 ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑉.  
Assume for a moment that both players' prize valuation is v and the unique 
equilibrium effort is 𝑒. By the proof of Proposition 2, 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒) > 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒)∀𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ≠
𝑒, and by (A.2) and the structure of Eπi40, 𝐵𝑅(𝑒) ∈ (𝑒, 𝑒) where by definition ∄𝑒 ∈
𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ∈ (𝑒, 𝑒). Now, let vi be player i's prize valuation for all iϵ{1,2}. By the continuity 
of Eπi and therefore of BRi(ej) in vi, there exists a neighborhood V of v for which 
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 Notice that player 2 always prefers to respond with e rather than ?̅? to 𝐵𝑅1(𝑞𝑒 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑒) when e= 
ec*-ε and ?̅? is sufficiently large. Thus, in this case, there does not exist an equilibrium in the case of 
mixed strategies. 
40
 For ej>0, Eπ(ei;ej) is concave in ei with a unique maximum at Eπ(BRi(ej);ej). Therefore, 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒) <
𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒) when 𝐵𝑅(𝑒) < 𝑒 < 𝑒, a contradiction. 
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𝐸𝜋𝑖(𝑒, 𝑒) > 𝐸𝜋𝑖(𝑒, 𝑒) ∀𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ≠ 𝑒 ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑉. Taking into account the equilibrium 
structure in Proposition 2 completes the proof.41     QED 
Proof of Example 3: In the first case, the matrix of the players' net payoffs is: 
player 2/ 
player 1 
1/9 1/5 5/9 
1/9 7/18, 8/9 31/126, 38/35 2/9, 10/9 
1/5 37/70, 38/63 3/10, 4/5 11/170, 140/153 
5/9 5/18, 1/18 55/306, 28/85 -1/18, 4/9 
 
Notice that 5/9 is a dominant strategy for player 2 and player 1's best response to 
5/9 is 1/9. 
In the second case, the matrix is: 
player 2/ 
player 1 
1/9 1/5 2/3 
1/9 7/18, 8/9 31/126, 38/35 2/63, 22/21 
1/5 37/70, 38/63 3/10, 4/5 2/65, 34/39 
2/3 4/21, 11/63 4/39, 17/65 -1/16, 1/3 
 
                                                          
41
 Notice that, when both players' prize valuation is v and 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒′) = 𝐸𝜋(𝑒, 𝑒′) for all 𝑒′ ∈ {𝑒, 𝑒} (i.e., 
?̂?=e), by the structure of Eπi, 𝐵𝑅(𝑒′) ∈ (𝑒, 𝑒), and by Proposition 2, there is a continuum of equilibria 
consisting of arbitrary weights given to {𝑒, ?̅?}. Therefore, given (A.5), when vi is player i's prize 
valuation for all iϵ{1,2}, there is a deleted neighborhood V of v for which there exists 𝑒𝑖
′ ∈ {𝑒, 𝑒} such 
that 𝐸𝜋𝑖(𝑒𝑖
′, 𝑒′′) > 𝐸𝜋𝑖(𝑒, 𝑒′′)∀𝑒′′ ∈ {𝑒, 𝑒}∀𝑒 ∈ 𝑆𝑖|𝑒 ≠ 𝑒𝑖
′∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑉∀𝑖.  
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Notice that for player 2, 1/9 is dominated by 2/3, and for player 1, 1/5 dominates 
2/3. However, there is no Nash equilibrium in the case of pure strategies. QED 
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